Case Study 1
Leon Keller was facing a charge of driving under the influence in Sometown. Police had pulled him over after he crossed the yellow line, and he had failed a field sobriety test. Tests confirmed his blood alcohol levels were above the legal limit, and so he had been charged. This was the first time he had been arrested and charged with a crime.
Keller, a 50-year-old man with a strong distrust of the legal system, did not want to hire an attorney. Instead, he wished to defend himself. In his mind, he had a solid defense. Keller was a man of above-average intelligence, who did not suffer from mental illness. He had attended college, but did not graduate. At his arraignment, he told Judge Jet that he wished to waive his right to counsel.
“Are you sure, Mr. Keller?” Judge Jet asked. “Yes, your Honor. I would like to defend myself against these charges.”
There was nothing to suggest that Leon Keller lacked the mental competence to defend himself. Judge Jet proceeded to give Keller a very stern warning about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. She asked him several questions about his education and then several more about any experience he had with the criminal justice system. Once Keller had answered her questions, the judge again asked Keller if he was absolutely sure of his decision. Keller answered that he was. Judge Jet expressed her reservations but allowed Keller to represent himself at trial. As a precaution, she appointed standby counsel.
Questions
1. What determination does a judge need to make before a defendant is allowed to represent himself or herself?
Before allowing a criminal defendant to exercise his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, a judge needs to determine if the defendant is mentally competent to make the decision and that the decision was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
2. Did Judge Jet satisfy the requirements in the case of Leon Keller?
In this example, Leon Keller was mentally competent to make the decision for himself. He did not suffer from mental illness, and he appeared to be of sound mind to Judge Jet. Before accepting his waiver, Judge Jet gave him a stern warning about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and asked him several questions to see if he understood what he was doing. After he answered her questions and still expressed a desire to represent himself, Judge Jet was satisfied and allowed him to proceed. She appointed standby counsel, just in case it was required.
3. What Supreme Court decision established the right to represent oneself? What was the Court’s reasoning?
The right to self-representation was recognized in Faretta v. California in 1975. The Court said that it was possible that a defendant might do a better job of representing himself or herself than an attorney. In addition, the only person who would suffer the consequences of the conviction is the defendant, and not the lawyer.
Case Study 2
Questions
1. What did the advocacy group base the appeal of Jones’s case on?
The advocacy group based the appeal on Jones’s grossly ineffective counsel. After Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court began hearing challenges to the effectiveness of the representation that indigent criminal defendants were receiving. Because a person represented by an attorney who does nothing is no better off than one who has no representation at all, the Court made it clear that a state’s Sixth Amendment duty is not discharged unless appointed counsel provides reasonably effective assistance and that ineffective assistance renders a conviction vulnerable to challenge.
2. Other than an appeal, how else could Jones have addressed this issue?
Claims of ineffective representation can also be brought through habeas corpus review.
3. In order for this kind of case to be found meritorious, what does the defendant need to be able to prove? How would this have worked out in Jones’s case?
The defendant must prove not only that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient (i.e., fell below reasonable professional standards), but also that (2) the outcome would probably have been different had the representation been adequate. Despite the fact that Jones’s representation was grossly inadequate, the outcome of the trial would most likely not have been different. There was ample evidence to establish Simpson’s guilt, and she had confessed to the crime.
Case Study 3
Questions
1. Suggestive measures during lineups can lead to them being discredited. What are ways that lineups can be suggestive, and how did police avoid it in this example?
Lineups that make the suspect look conspicuous are problematic. Selecting participants who are of a different race, height, and build from the witness’s description or the suspect can make the suspect stand out. Another example is having the suspect wear distinctive clothing. In this case, police selected women who matched Rachel Hanger’s race, height, weight, and general appearance. Because they were all inmates, they were wearing the same prison uniform.
2. Criminal prosecution has already been initiated, and Rachel Hanger has an attorney. What are the constitutional requirements for a lineup at this stage, and were they met?
To meet due process requirements, police must select an identification procedure that is appropriate under the circumstances and avoid unnecessary suggestiveness in conducting the procedure. As discussed in question 1, this requirement was met. To meet Sixth Amendment requirements for a lineup, police must either obtain a waiver of the right to counsel, secure appointed counsel, or wait for retained counsel to arrive. In the example above, police asked Rachel Hanger to appear in a lineup, and she requested that her counsel be present. Police contacted Attorney Hunt and waited for her to arrive. The Sixth Amendment requirements were satisfied.
3. If this lineup was overly suggestive and police selected a lineup certain to make Rachel Hanger stand out, what would happen to the identification and the witness’s testimony?
An unnecessarily suggestive lineup can weaken the prosecution’s case against the defendant. Testimony about the identification will be suppressed, and unless the witness’s testimony stems from independent recollection of the crime, the witness will not be allowed to identify the defendant in court. Even if the judge allows the witness to identify the defendant, the defense will be able to argue to the jury why it should not trust the witness.
Case Study 4
Questions
1. Which of the three grounds—the Fourth Amendment, due process clause, or Sixth Amendment right to counsel—appears most promising for this challenge?
The defendant can object to the witness’s identification under the Fourth Amendment. Police illegally detained him (by ordering him to “stay there”) so that they could take his photograph and put it in the police department’s “gang file” for use in future criminal investigations. Police had no grounds for the detention. Even though the defendant was suspected of street gang membership, he and his companions were doing nothing suspicious when they were detained; membership in a gang is not a crime. Where police deliberately violate a person’s Fourth Amendment rights for the sake of obtaining his or her photograph, the photograph constitutes the tainted fruits of the poisonous tree, and subsequent witness identifications made from that photographs are inadmissible as evidence. The facts of this problem were taken from People v. Rodriguez, 21 Cal.App.4th 232, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 660 (Cal.App. 4 Dist, 1993), where the court held that the witness identification was inadmissible as evidence.
Case Study 5
Questions
1. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits admission of testimony about pretrial identifications obtained under (1) impermissibly suggestive circumstances that (2) create a substantial risk of misidentification. Should the court have admitted Davis’s testimony about her pretrial identification?
No. Showups are the most inherent suggestive of the three identification procedures because only one person is presented to the witness for identification, that person is in police custody, and the clear inference is that police think he’s the one who did it. Though showups are permitted because they facilitate efficient police work, courts carefully scrutinize the manner in which they are conducted to make sure police do not add to the suggestiveness inherent in the procedure. Officer Jackson did so when he told Davis “We’ve apprehended your assailant. We’re going to drive over to the park to see ‘if you can make a positive ID on the person.’” That came close to being a directive to identify the person police had taken into custody.
Determination that the identification procedure was conducted in an impermissibly suggestive manner does not end the inquiry. Courts consider five factors in deciding whether the impermissibly suggestive procedures tainted the identification by creating a substantial risk of misidentification: (1) The opportunity the witness had to view the perpetrator at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the prior description, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and (5) the time between the crime and the confrontation. Although the last two factors favor admission of Davis’s testimony, the first three factors point strongly in the opposite direction. The attack happened quickly; it was nighttime; the area was dark; she was attacked from the rear; her assailant grabbed her purse and fled; and she was frightened and in shock, and probably more concerned about her safety than getting a good look at her assailant. Her initial description was inaccurate. She adjusted her description to fit the defendant’s characteristics after she made a positive identification at the showup. There was another factor at play that courts are just beginning to recognize. People, especially white people, have difficulty identifying members of other races. This phenomenon is known as “cross-racial impairment.”
These factors combine to cast doubts on Davis’s ability to acquire an accurate memory impression of the event, making her vulnerable to the corrupting effect of Officer Jackson’s suggestion that police had apprehended her assailant. Not only is Davis’s testimony about the identification she made at the showup inadmissible, the court should not have allowed her to make an in-court identification at the trial. She did not have an independent recollection of the defendant acquired at the time of the assault that could provide the basis for an-court identification. The only recollection she had of him was the one she acquired during the tainted showup procedure. Consequently, none of her testimony should have been admitted.
The facts of this problem were taken from State v. New Jersey, 95 A.3d 769 (N.J. 2014). The court held that the victim’s testimony was inadmissible and overturned the defendant’s conviction.