Chapter Summary<\/summary>\nThis chapter explores the early development of the psychological laboratory by comparing the contrasting approaches of Francis Galton and Wilhelm Wundt, with a focus on how each attempted to render measurable various mental attributes. The chapter argues that decisions about what to measure in psychology, whether as consciousness, reaction time, intelligence, visual acuity, and so on, are never purely objective. Rather, they are shaped by personal, philosophical, and cultural factors. Wundt\u2019s laboratory was devoted to gaining introspective access to universal mental processes, while Galton assembled a laboratory packed with a variety of scientific instruments, ultimately aimed at assessing individual differences. Drawing on Joel Michell\u2019s critique of measurement in the human sciences, the chapter introduces the idea that psychology\u2019s embrace of quantification was founded not on empirical demonstration but on metaphysical assumptions; that is, deeply held but untested beliefs about the nature of psychological phenomena. Michell argues that figures such as Wundt and Galton simply assumed, rather than actually proving, that mental attributes were capable of being quantified. This assumption underpinned entire measurement systems, even though there was little justification for treating psychological faculties as possessing numerical magnitude. By situating these measurement practices within the imaginary of the laboratory, the chapter shows how early psychology functioned as both an empirical science and a system of social classification. Psychological laboratories were not just spaces of discovery but institutions that helped define what counts as normal, deviant, intelligent, or conscious. Through this critical lens, measurement is revealed not as the mirror of nature but as a tool of power.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
\n
\n
Chapter 6 – Quiz<\/h2>\n\n\n\n